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To be a Bosniak or to be a citizen?
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 2013 census
as an election
LAURENCE COOLEY
International Development Department, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston,
Birmingham, UK
ABSTRACT. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ﬁrst post-war population census, held in 2013,
was accompanied by campaigns associated with each of the country’s three main ethnic
groups, which sought to maximise their share of the recorded population. These cam-
paigns were challenged by a rival ‘civic’ campaign that instead stressed the right to free-
dom of self-identiﬁcation, however. This article compares the aims, methods and
framings used by this civic campaign with those of the most prominent of the ‘ethnic’
campaigns – that of Bosniak ethnic entrepreneurs. It demonstrates that the two cam-
paigns were each motivated by a combination of symbolic motives, centred on recogni-
tion and highlighting discrimination, and instrumental motives relating to the country’s
power-sharing institutions. The limited success of the civic campaign in countering the
messages of its rival ethnic campaigns demonstrates the difﬁculties that civic move-
ments face in mobilising citizens in consociational democracies such as BiH.
KEYWORDS: Balkans, civic nationalism, consociationalism, demography, ethnic
nationalism
Introduction
In his classic study of ethnic conﬂict, Donald Horowitz notes that in deeply di-
vided societies, elections tend to resemble ethnic censuses but also that population
censuses become contests ‘to be “won”’. ‘So the election is a census’, he summa-
rises, ‘and the census is an election’ (Horowitz 1985: 196). Both of these observa-
tions apply to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Elections to the country’s power-
sharing institutions, established by the Dayton Agreement that ended the war of
1992–95, have largely been dominated by ethnic parties. The country’s ﬁrst census
since independence, conducted in 2013, meanwhile, resembled an election cam-
paign, with politicians and civil society organisations associated with each of the
country’s three largest ethnic groups –Bosniaks, Serbs andCroats – seeking to en-
sure the maximisation of their share in the population statistics. That such cam-
paigns were a feature of the census is perhaps not surprising, and indeed similar
mobilisation has been a feature of censuses in other deeply divided societies.What
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is more noteworthy is that these ethno-nationalist campaigns faced competition
from organisations that stressed citizens’ rights to self-identiﬁcation, free from po-
litical pressure. Somemembers of this campaignwent further, suggesting that peo-
ple should opt out of identifying as Bosniak, Serb or Croat and instead declare
themselves to simply be ‘Bosnians’.
In order to understand why this ‘civic’ campaign emerged and to consider
the extent to which it was successful, this article compares the campaign’s
aims, methods and framing of appeals with those of the most prominent of
the ‘ethnic’ campaigns – the Bosniak campaign to encourage identiﬁcation
with the largest of BiH’s ‘constituent peoples’ – and assesses the relative suc-
cess of the two. In doing so, the article contributes to our understanding both
of census politics in deeply divided societies, by examining a case of resistance
to ethno-national categorisation, and of the challenges of civic mobilisation
under a consociational political system.
The article brieﬂy surveys the literature on census politics in deeply divided
societies, which identiﬁes the census as a key site for the negotiation,
legitimisation and contestation of identities. This literature suggests that cen-
sus campaigns are motivated by both symbolic and instrumental rationales,
and I adopt this categorisation as a way of analysing the 2013 Bosnian census
campaigns. After introducing the political context of BiH’s ﬁrst post-war cen-
sus, the article then considers the Bosniak and civic census campaigns in turn,
outlining what their aims were, the methods they employed and the ways in
which they framed their messages, before turning to the campaigns’ reactions
to the results of the census. While the analysis shows that the civic campaign
was partially successful in inﬂuencing the design of the census, its results dem-
onstrate that only a small proportion of the population were willing to reject
ethnic identiﬁcation. The article concludes by reﬂecting on what the case tells
us about the difﬁculties of successful civic mobilisation in BiH.
Census politics in deeply divided societies: a framework for analysis
Against the conventional, ‘statistical realist’ view of censuses as exercises that
enumerate objects that ‘[exist] previous to and outside of statistics’ (Labbé
2000, cited by Kertzer and Arel 2002: 19), anthropologists have argued that
the census plays a signiﬁcant role in the social construction of identities. Ben-
edict Anderson’s (1991) work stands out here for foregrounding the colonial
census, alongside the map and the museum, as a key institution in the construc-
tion and reiﬁcation of ethnic and racial identities. Drawing on Hirschman’s
(1987) analysis of the evolution of the identity categories employed in censuses
of what is now Malaysia, Anderson argues that:
It is extremely unlikely that … more than a tiny fraction of those categorized and
subcategorized would have recognized themselves under such labels. These ‘identities’,
imagined by the (confusedly) classifying mind of the colonial state, still awaited a
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reiﬁcation which imperial administrative penetration would soon make possible. (An-
derson 1991: 165)
Similarly, James Scott highlights the power of the state, through institutions
such as the census, to shape identities, arguing that ‘the state, of all institutions,
is best equipped to insist on treating people according to its schemata’ and that
categories invented by ofﬁcials such as census takers ‘can end by becoming
categories that organize people’s daily experience precisely because they are
embedded in state-created institutions that structure that experience’ (Scott
1998: 82–83).
From this perspective, then, ‘ofﬁcial statistics do not simply mirror, but help
produce social realities’ (Lieberman and Singh 2017: 1). The designers of
ofﬁcial categorisation schemes do not get things all their own way, however,
and citizens are not merely passive subjects of categorisation. As Starr notes,
‘[w]hen institutions classify … they often confront the self-conceptions of the
subjects’ (Starr 1992: 269). Populations often resist, subvert or attempt to inﬂu-
ence the design of ofﬁcial categorisations. In this vein, Urla argues that ‘[i]n
asking how quantifying techniques and discourses operate as technologies of
power, we cannot assume that quantiﬁcation is always a form of domination
imposed upon an unwitting and silent populace’ (Urla 1993: 837). In her study
of the Basque language movement, Urla notes that ‘minorities may also turn
to statistics as a means of contesting state power and hegemonic constructions
of social reality’ (emphasis in original). Similarly, Patriarca argues that while
people might conform to categorisations employed in ofﬁcial statistics, ‘[c]
ensus-takers and statisticians … have little control over the life of the catego-
ries and classiﬁcations that they establish’ (Patriarca 1996: 11). Kertzer and
Arel argue that since the ﬁrst modern censuses, states’ attempts to pigeon-hole
individuals into categories of identity have faced resistance (Kertzer and Arel
2002: 27). They cite an example from Bernard Cohn’s (1987) study of the cen-
sus in colonial India, where in 1931 in Lahore, activists from the Arya Samaj
movement distributed a leaﬂet instructing people how to answer questions
on religion, sect, caste, race and language. This literature demonstrates how
‘the census constitutes a site where the state, citizens, and groups representing
majorities and minorities negotiate national identities’ (Bieber 2015: 873).
In explaining why ethnic entrepreneurs seek to inﬂuence group members’ re-
sponses to identity questions, Kertzer and Arel note that census politics has an
emotional dimension, in that the census confers recognition on groups, but
also an instrumental dimension, whereby ‘the pursuit of entitlement translates
into a contest for achieving the “right” numbers’. They argue that ‘[i]dentity
politics is a numbers game, or more precisely a battle over relative proportions,
both within the state and within particular territories of the larger state’
(Kertzer and Arel 2002: 30). Bieber similarly points to symbolic and instru-
mental motives, highlighting three reasons for political interest in the census
in divided societies. First, where legal entitlements such as minority rights
are linked to census results, ‘minority representatives have a vested interest
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in securing a high number of minorities in particular regions’ (Bieber 2015: 887).
Second, evenwhere such entitlements are not legally binding, ‘numerical strength
is crucial for making claims and symbolic entitlement’, serving to distinguish
between those groups that are obviously minorities and those that can claim
(co-)ownership of the state. Finally, the size of a group as demonstrated by the
census provides political parties claiming to represent the group with political
capital and legitimacy. Where parties are dependent on ethno-national appeals,
a signiﬁcant number of people opting out of identiﬁcation with parties’ preferred
identity categories threatens to undermine their power (Bieber 2015: 888).
As the brief discussion here suggests, where the existing literature has
examined attempts to inﬂuence census outcomes, it has done so by analysing
the campaigns of ethnic entrepreneurs. In order to broaden the focus of this liter-
ature, the present article provides a comparative analysis of ethnic and civic cam-
paigns in BiH. Whereas ethnic parties and campaigns seek to represent the
interests of a single group within society, civic movements attempt to bring
people from across ethnic divides together in pursuit of common goals, poten-
tially leading to social and political transformation of a deeply divided society
(Murtagh 2016: 150).
In order to understand what motivates these campaigns and how they frame
their appeals, the article adopts the analytical distinction between symbolic and
instrumental motives for engagement with the census. To operationalise this
framework, I draw on semi-structured interviews conducted with 17 key partici-
pants in the campaigns and the broader Bosnian census process, the campaigns’
own published materials, and media coverage of their activities.1 Interviews were
conducted in Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Tuzla in October and November 2017,
with participants selected based on an initial internet search, consultation with
a project advisory group, and some chain referrals. The majority of the interviews
were conducted in English, but a small number were conducted in Bosnian/Cro-
atian/Serbian with the assistance of a translator. The published materials were
identiﬁed through detailed searching of organisations’ websites, social media
channels, and English- and local-language media.
The 2013 census in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Prior to 2013, the last census to have been conducted in BiH was the ﬁnal Yu-
goslav census, which took place in April 1991.2 A year later, the country had
declared its independence from Yugoslavia, marking the start of a conﬂict that
lasted for more than three and a half years and which resulted in the death of
approximately 100,000 combatants and civilians, and the displacement of
many times that number. The Dayton Agreement, which ﬁnally brought the
conﬂict to an end in 1995, preserved the territorial integrity of BiH but
recognised the state as the home of three ‘constituent peoples’ – Bosniaks,
Serbs and Croats – and granted signiﬁcant power to two territorial entities,
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska
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(RS). Dayton represented a compromise whereby the Bosniak and Croat Fed-
eration leadership accepted the existence of the Serb-dominated RS as the
price for preserving BiH’s borders, and the leadership of the RS accepted some
minimal powers being given to the central state (Belloni 2007: 15–17). Dayton
also established a new constitution, setting out a complex system of consocia-
tional power sharing whereby the constituent peoples are guaranteed represen-
tation at all levels of government in both entities and in state institutions,
which are headed by a rotating three-member state presidency.
While the signiﬁcant casualty toll of the conﬂict and the internal displace-
ment and refugee ﬂows it resulted in meant that a post-war census was
desperately needed, the nature of the institutions created by Dayton presented
signiﬁcant obstacles to such an exercise. Since the establishment of a state-level
statistical ofﬁce in 1998, the country’s statistical system has been made up of
three ofﬁces: the Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the state
level, the Federal Ofﬁce of Statistics in the FBiH, and the Republika Srpska
Institute of Statistics in the RS.3 This arrangement, along with the
power-sharing nature of the country’s political institutions, which grant exten-
sive veto powers to the representatives of the constituent peoples, made
reaching agreement on holding a census elusive, with the result that BiH did
not participate in the 2000 global census round.
The country came under increasing pressure during the mid-2000s to com-
mit to holding a census in the 2010 round. The UN Development Programme
(UNDP) expressed concern in 2004 that BiH still lacked reliable sources of
data on poverty and economic dislocation resulting from the war. In 2005,
UNDP and the European Commission’s Delegation in Sarajevo published a
joint paper anticipating a census to be held as part of the 2010 census round
(Perry 2013: 5). Later, EU ofﬁcials came to present a census as a de facto, if
not formal, condition of BiH’s progress towards membership, as a requirement
for structural reform amongst other demands of the accession process (Weber
and Perry 2017: 13).
A signiﬁcant obstacle to conducting a census was disagreement between the
representatives of the three constituent peoples. Bosnian Serb politicians were
the keenest to hold a census, proposing legislation for one as early as 2004,
since they expected it to demonstrate the extent of the Serb majority in the
Republika Srpska. Parties representing Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks were less
enthusiastic about collecting identity data. Croat parties feared that a census
would demonstrate the extent of population decline amongst Croats, whereas
for Bosniak parties the concern was that it would conﬁrm the results of ethnic
cleansing of Bosniaks from areas such as the Drina Valley and the northern RS
(Armakolas and Maksimović 2014: 70; Perry 2013: 5–6).
Eventually, in February 2012, a political compromise was reached and the
Parliamentary Assembly adopted a law on the census, specifying that it should
take place in April 2013 (Perry 2013: 6). The law included a deﬁnition of ‘usual
residents’ who would be enumerated, and also a list of topics, including ethnic/
national afﬁliation, religion and mother tongue. The Agency for Statistics
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quickly published a draft questionnaire, indicating that what came to be
known as the three ‘sensitive questions’ would be presented in what some com-
mentators described as a ‘closed’ format (Perry 2013: 11).4 For example, the
question on ethnicity/nationality was accompanied by tick boxes for
‘Bosniak’, ‘Croat’, ‘Serb’ and ‘Other’, with a write-in option only available
to those selecting ‘Other’.5 The draft questionnaire established that people
would be able to opt for a ‘do not declare’ option for ethnicity/nationality
and religion but that the language question would be mandatory (an important
caveat, given that language can be used as a proxy for ethnic/national belong-
ing in BiH). Following pressure from civil society, the Agency published a
modiﬁed draft of the questionnaire in July 2012, with each of the three sensi-
tive questions now immediately followed by an open text box, with the tick
boxes relegated beneath. The agency explained that with the new census form,
an enumerator would ask the sensitive questions and record responses as
stated, either by writing in the answer or, should the answer match, by ticking
the relevant box (Perry 2013: 12–13).
The format of the three sensitive questions seemingly agreed upon, in
January 2013 it was announced that the census would be delayed by six
months. This followed a recommendation by the International Monitoring
Operation (IMO), established by the European Commission, the Council of
Europe and Bosnian Council of Ministers to monitor the census, which sug-
gested that preparations were not sufﬁciently advanced (International Moni-
toring Operation 2012c: 24). Amid concern that the format of the sensitive
questions might be reverted to the original version, civil society organisations
threatened to call a boycott of the census should this happen (Arnautović
2013). The census ﬁnally took place, with the revised questions, between 1
and 15 October 2013. While there were reports of irregularities in the enumer-
ation, from a technical perspective, the census ‘unfolded relatively smoothly’
(Perry 2015: 58). Preliminary results were published in November, but there
was a signiﬁcant delay before the release of the ﬁnal results, including data
from the three sensitive questions, due to disagreements amongst the entity
and state statistics agencies. Faced with an EU-imposed deadline, the Agency
for Statistics published the complete results in June 2016, without the agree-
ment of the RS Institute of Statistics (Toe 2016). The IMO concluded in its
ﬁnal report in October 2016 that ‘the census in Bosnia and Herzegovina was
as a whole conducted in compliance with international standards’ and that
‘the census results are in general considered valid and useful for economic
and social policy planning’ (International Monitoring Operation 2016: 9).
While this confers international recognition on the published results, they re-
main contested domestically, with the RS Institute of Statistics arguing that
the published population statistics include a large number of people that it
does not consider to have been resident at the time of the census and publishing
its own version of the results (Republika Srpska Institute of Statistics 2017). To
understand this contestation, it is necessary to examine the campaigns that ac-
companied the census enumeration, which is what the article now turns to.
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Bitno je biti Bošnjak: the Bosniak campaign
As enumeration approached, an effort to encourage Bosniaks to answer the
three sensitive questions on the census in a structured and speciﬁed way
emerged, driven by several organisations, including the largest Bosniak politi-
cal party, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and coalitions formed for
the speciﬁc purpose of this mobilisation. Two coalitions were particularly
active. As Perry (2013: 13) notes, the ﬁrst to call on Bosniaks to identify as
Bosniaks, as practicing Islam and as speaking the Bosnian language was a
coalition called Fondacija Popis 2013 [Foundation Census 2013], which
brought together ﬁve key social institutions, including the Islamic Community
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosniak Institute. The second coalition
was formed of NGOs, including the Bosniak Movement for Equality of
Peoples, as well as overseas and diaspora organisations such as the Institute
for Research on Genocide, based in Canada, and the Congress of North
American Bosniaks, which came together in August 2012 under the slogan
Bitno je biti Bošnjak [It is important to be Bosniak].6
Two key methods of the Bitno je biti Bošnjak campaign were its use of
banners and signs outside of mosques and its production of videos stressing
the importance of Bosniaks responding to the three identity questions in a struc-
tured way. One video, for example, featured men tearing tape from their
mouths to declare ‘Ja sam Bošnjak, vjera mi je Islam, jezik mi je Bosanski’ [‘I
am Bosniak, my religion is Islam, my language is Bosnian’].7 Other videos were
notable – and controversial – for featuring children discussing the importance
of Bosniak identity (Armakolas andMaksimović 2014: 60).8 Much of this cam-
paign was not centrally directed, as one of its leaders explained in an interview:
I didn’t work on the internet campaign [but] when the census ended in October and
when I went online, I typed in ‘Bitno je biti Bošnjak’ and I saw 3 million results –
people created some improvised videos in the villages … banners.9
Both coalitions also ran public events and panel discussions. According to a
member of Fondacija Popis 2013, whereas the Bitno je biti Bošnjak events were
focused almost exclusively on the three sensitive questions and involved mem-
bers of the coalition instructing Bosniaks how to answer these questions, the
Fondacija events covered the census more broadly, giving more space for
audience questions and interaction, in line with the group’s self-portrayal as
a neutral information provider.10 Indeed, the Fondacija website contained
signiﬁcant amounts of information on the census.11 Yet the coalition was also
involved in encouraging Bosniaks to identify in the same structured manner as
Bitno je biti Bošnjak did, for example, through a leaﬂet illustrating which an-
swers they should give, accompanied by inspirational quotes from wartime
Bosnian president Alija Izetbegović and author Alija Isaković.12
In order to understand why a campaign emerged to instruct Bosniaks to
identify in a structured manner, it is necessary to look to broader debates
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about Bosniak ethnicity and the implications of Bosniaks’ status as the largest
of the three constituent peoples. The group now commonly referred to as
Bosniaks were not given their own category in the Yugoslav census until
1971, when Muslim nationality was added alongside Serb, Croat and
Yugoslav categories as a result of decisions on ofﬁcial recognition taken in
the 1960s (Markowitz 2007: 52; see also Bieber 2015: 880–82). This category
survived through to the ﬁnal Yugoslav census in 1991, but in 1993, the
Bošnjački sabor [Bosniak Assembly] ofﬁcially adopted the name ‘Bosniak’
(Bougarel 2018: 143; Bringa 1995: 33–36). The 2013 census was the ﬁrst in
which people could identify under this label (Armakolas and Maksimović
2014: 71). This opportunity, however, came with the possibility that Bosniaks
might split themselves between several descriptions. A key concern for cam-
paigners was that their target population should not act in such a way to split
the group between ‘Bosniaks’ and ‘Muslims’, given that many older citizens
would have memories of the old, Yugoslav census categories. As one cam-
paigner argued: ‘we had … to explain this to the people, which was very hard
because some people said that they were born as Muslims, lived as Muslims
and asked what kind of a term was this new one’.13
The threat was not only that some Bosniaks might identity as Muslim in re-
sponse to the ethnic/national afﬁliation question but also that they might opt
to describe themselves simply as ‘Bosnian’. This ‘danger’ was perceived to stem
partly from Bosniaks’ status as the largest of the three constituent peoples and
also from the actions of the civic campaign, which were thought to be more
likely to inﬂuence Bosniaks than Serbs or Croats. As Armakolas and
Maksimović (2014: 71) argue:
[W]ith Bosnian Serbs and Croats by and large attracted by nation-building processes of
their neighbouring mother states, Bosniaks are largely alone in promoting the idea of
tying national identiﬁcation with an independent Bosnian state. However, this leaves
them exposed to the attractiveness of political versions of ‘Bosnianness’.
The sense of risk that Bosniaks might identify as Bosnian was heightened by
a story published in the Dnevni list newspaper in November 2012, which
claimed that in the test census held in October, some 35 per cent of respon-
dents gave their ethnicity as Bosnian and/or Herzegovinian (see Bieber
2012). A number of other surveys had also demonstrated that a large minor-
ity of Bosnians consider themselves ﬁrst and foremost citizens of BiH rather
than as members of the constituent peoples (see, for example, Oxford
Research International 2007).14
Campaigners therefore argued that there was a risk that Bosniaks would be
split amongst various categories and needed to be educated about the conse-
quences of this. For instance, a press release published by the Congress of
North American Bosniaks in November 2012 stated that even prior to the cen-
sus being announced, ‘many Bosniaks were confused regarding the terminol-
ogy Bosnian, Muslim or Bosniak. This dilemma is a direct result of decades
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of exclusion and obstruction of Bosniaks from suing their national identity as
Bosniaks’ (Congress of North American Bosniaks 2012). Prominent SDA pol-
itician Sulejman Tihić also stressed that ‘it’s important to explain to citizens
that they’re no less Bosnians if they declare to be Bosniaks, love Bosnia no less
if they declare to be Bosniak and not Bosnian’ (Arnautović 2013).
The desire to unite Bosniaks under a single label had both symbolic and in-
strumental elements. Symbolically, the census provided an opportunity for rec-
ognition of the Bosniak identity after a long period of what campaigners
perceived as denial of that identity. At a press conference held by Fondacija
Popis 2013 in Sarajevo in September 2013, for instance, campaigners argued
that ‘[t]he name Bosniak as the autochthonous European people present in this
area will after the census, ofﬁcially be registered in all statistical data of
Eurostat’ and that ‘[t]his is the ﬁrst time in history that Bosniaks can freely
and openly say who they are and what they are’ (Anadolija 2013). Similarly,
the Congress of North American Bosniaks stated in a press release in
November 2012 that ‘[t]he traditional Bosniak name binds the Bosniak people
as an indigenous nation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the territorial area of
Bosnia and Herzegovina along with its legal system of government and its
community’ (Congress of North American Bosniaks 2012). While the label
‘Bosniak’ was important for Bitno je biti Bošnjak campaigners, a key member
of Fondacija Popis 2013 argued in an interview, by contrast, that it was not the
precise name that mattered (illustrating this by arguing that Bosniaks could
change their name to Martians for all the name mattered) but rather that for
a century, ‘there have been constant efforts that that group does not exist’.
The interviewee referred to the UN Charter and its provisions regarding the
culture, political aspirations and right to self-determination of peoples, arguing
that this gave Bosniaks the right to ‘name themselves however they choose’.15
A Bitno je biti Bošnjak interviewee also cited historical attempts to deny
Bosniaks’ identity, arguing that in early Yugoslav censuses, Bosniaks ‘had to
declare either as Serbs or Croats’.16
More instrumentally, campaigners emphasised potential links between pop-
ulation shares and political representation. At the September Fondacija press
conference, a representative of the Islamic Community stated that ‘the census
results will have direct political implications because of the distribution of col-
lective rights in BiH’ (Anadolija 2013). Similarly, speaking in February 2013,
Sejfudin Tokić, one of the leaders of the Bitno je biti Bošnjak coalition, stated
that the census was a historically important event, with ‘long-term conse-
quences for the constitutional set-up in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its future’,
claiming that the ‘more Bosniaks are enumerated in the census, the more stable
BiH will be and its European democratic future will be clearer’. Tokić also
expressed fears about initiatives for constitutional reform that would involve
the reorganisation of the FBiH, which could result in a ‘reduction of living
space for Bosniaks’, referring to this as the potential ‘Palestinisation of the
Bosniak people’ (FENA 2013). Members of both groupings recognised the
potential attractiveness to Bosniaks of identifying simply as ‘Bosnian’. In an
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 2013 census as an election 1073
© 2019 The Authors Nations and Nationalism published by Association for the Study of Ethnicity
and Nationalism and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
interview, a member of the Bitno je biti Bošnjak coalition argued that ‘a large
number of people love this country, and it seemed very logical for them to de-
clare as Bosnians’. The same interviewee, however, also stated that should
Bosniaks have self-identiﬁed as Bosnians, then they would have been opening
themselves up to discrimination under the current constitutional framework, ar-
guing that in doing so, ‘a large number of our people [would step] outside the
rights given to the constituent peoples’.17 The interviewee elaborated that ‘our
people [Bosniaks] cannot run for ofﬁce in the Republika Srpska entity, and ad-
ditionally if some people were to declare as Bosnians they wouldn’t have the
right to run for ofﬁce in the Federation too’.18 Both this interviewee and a rep-
resentative of Fondacija Popis 2013 contrasted the Bosnian political systemwith
‘Western systems’, using the United States as an example. The Bitno je biti
Bošnjak representative pointed out that ‘all the people there are Americans in
the national sense, and they can be whatever they want in the ethnic sense’.19
The Fondacija Popis 2013 member argued that while it might be desirable for
there to be a similar, overarching Bosnian identity, with the capacity to encom-
pass private, ethnic identities, this was something that could only be achieved in
the distant future. The interviewee stated that he would be willing to sign up to
identifying as ‘whatever they put in front of me, if you are able to persuade
Mostar and Banja Luka’ –meaning that he would identify as Bosnian if it could
be guaranteed that Croats and Serbs would do the same.20
Bosniak campaigners stressed in interviews that they did not necessarily
support the current constitutional arrangements. Rather, they were operating
within its constraints and according to its incentive structures. One, for
instance, spoke of ‘the unfortunate domination of the three peoples and the
discrimination of the Others’ under the Dayton constitution.21 This concern
for discrimination against ‘Others’ also extended, for one interviewee, to an
argument that, should Bosniaks choose to identify as Bosnian, then they would
be denying ‘genuine Others’, such as those from mixed backgrounds, the
opportunity of having a category of their own. Relaying the story of a
mixed-ethnicity relative, the interviewee asked ‘what would be available for
him?’, explaining: ‘he cannot identify himself as any group, including now
the ethnic group of Bosnians, which is sort of generic and should be available
for somebody like him’.22
As well as targeting Bosniaks inside BiH, both coalitions engaged exten-
sively with the diaspora. In line with international guidelines (see UNECE
2006: 35; UN Statistics Division 2008: 102–03), the census law deﬁned ‘usual
residents’ as those people who, at the time of enumeration, had lived in their
place of residence for at least 12 months, or who had arrived there within
the past 12 months but intended to stay for at least a year. Where citizens were
working abroad temporarily for a period of less than 12 months, the law
speciﬁed that they should be included in the count, but some diaspora groups
argued that the census should also include non-resident citizens (Perry 2015:
57), and portrayed their exclusion as an attempt to legalise wartime expulsions
of Bosniaks, particularly from the RS. A Bosniak diaspora organisation in
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Chicago, for instance, stated in its web magazine that ‘[t]he census introduces
the ﬁnal phase of eliminating refugees and displaced persons: their removal
from the population register’ (quoted in Armakolas and Maksimović 2014:
86). As a compromise, a supplemental form was made available online,
allowing members of the diaspora to be counted, but not as part of the census
proper (Perry 2015: 57).
Despite the provision made to enumerate the diaspora in a parallel process,
some groups – particularly Bosniak ones, given the extent of Bosniak displace-
ment during the war – engaged in a campaign to encourage members of the
diaspora with properties in BiH to visit the country for the census. Both the
Bitno je biti Bošnjak and Fondacija Popis 2013 coalitions organised events in
countries with signiﬁcant Bosniak diaspora populations (see, for example,
Bošnjaci.net 2013; Raja Chicago 2013), and the Fondacija provided instruc-
tions on its website explaining how members of the diaspora could be
enumerated.23 As Perry (2013: 14) notes, there were media reports that some
organisations were even funding return trips. Also encouraging diaspora enu-
meration were rumours that emigrants might stand to lose their property rights
if they were not included in the census. While interviewees were keen to stress
that they did not attribute these rumours to the actions of the Bosniak
campaign,24 it is clear that ‘[m]isinformation ﬂowed easily in the absence of
facts and comprehensive myth-busting’ (Perry 2013: 14).
In justifying actions aimed at encouraging members of the Bosniak diaspora
to return to BiH to be enumerated, activists made appeals to international legal
principles, arguing that these should override the census law. A member of
Fondacija Popis 2013 argued, for example, that the exclusion of citizens from
the census based on the fact that they had been absent for more than 12 months
was in conﬂict with the right of refugees to return to their pre-war property and
that people had the right to be enumerated if they had an intention to return to
BiH, regardless of how long they had been absent.25 A statement by the
Institute for Research of Genocide, Canada, addressed to Bosnian and
international institutions and published as enumeration was coming to an end
in October 2013, put this more strongly, arguing that:
[M]ore than a million citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who were expelled from their
homeland as a result of aggression and genocide are currently experiencing added crime
through Census. Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who were ethnically cleansed and
now live all over the world are not being included in the Census as if they are
non-existent. (Boyle et al. 2013)
Budi građanin/građanka: the civic campaign
The Bosniak and other ethnic campaigns to inﬂuence citizens’ responses to the
census faced a rival, civic campaign, which emerged from the lobbying that
took place following the publication of the draft census questionnaire, featur-
ing ‘closed’ identity questions, in February 2012. Many of the activists
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associated with the civic campaign would have preferred if the census had not
asked questions on identity at all, but since the questions to be included had
been speciﬁed in the census law (which was drafted and adopted without con-
sultation with civil society), there was no space for arguing that they should be
omitted. As one activist explained:
[We were] trying to intervene at the point where the law on census had already been
adopted. And that already poses severe constraints on any kind of activism because
the law stipulated actually very precisely questions that are going to be asked and par-
ticularly those questions that we are going to address as part of our actions, advocacy.26
The early aim of civic activists was therefore to open up the questions on
ethnicity/nationality, religion and language. Their success in doing so was
made possible because of the presence and role of the IMO. Rather than
attempting to lobby politicians or the Agency for Statistics directly, activists in-
stead directed their arguments at the IMO, which in turn persuaded politicians
to modify the questionnaire.27 Štefan Füle, the EU’s enlargement commis-
sioner, conﬁrmed in a response to a question in the European Parliament in
October 2012 that the sensitive questions had been made more open, after the
IMO and the European Commission had raised them with the Bosnian Council
of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly, and stated that the Commission
would continue to engage in dialogue with civil society actors about the census
(Füle 2012).
In campaigning for more open questions, members of the civic campaign
made appeals to international standards, and in particular the UN’s principles
and recommendations for population and housing censuses. These deﬁne eth-
nicity, religion and language as outside of the ‘core’ topics, meaning that the
decision to include them is dependent on national need and circumstances.
The recommendations specify that due to the subjective and potentially mixed
nature of individuals’ ethnic identiﬁcation, questions about ethnicity should,
where asked, acquire data through self-declaration and allow for multiple afﬁl-
iations (UN Statistics Division 2008: 139). The UN Economic Commission for
Europe’s recommendations for the 2010 census round went further, stating
that ethnicity questions should ‘always be based on the free self-declaration
of a person’ and that ‘questionnaires should include an open question and
interviewers should refrain from suggesting answers to the respondents’. A
similar recommendation was made for questions on religion, and the recom-
mendations also stated that questions on main or mother language should in-
clude an open box (UNECE 2006: 96–97). Appeals to these recommendations
were picked up by the IMO, which noted with concern in its early reports that
the sensitive questions on the draft questionnaire were not in the open format
recommended by European guidelines (International Monitoring Operation
2012a: 19; International Monitoring Operation 2012b: 16–18).
According to one activist, the civic campaign pushed for an open format by
arguing that ‘we have to do it [the census] according to international standards
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because we have to make comparisons with other countries … and when we
have the same methodology and the similar questionnaires, then you can make
it easier’.28 The Inicijativa za slobodu izjašnjavanja [Initiative for Freedom of
Declaration], an ad hoc coalition of organisations concerned about the census
process, posted images on social media of other countries’ census questions on
ethnicity, religion and language, demonstrating how these questions were more
open than those of the draft Bosnian questionnaire.29 IMO reports make clear
that these appeals inﬂuenced the ﬁnal design of the questionnaire. The second
report, published in July 2012, notes that ‘discussions held with civil society
representatives as well as articles published in the BiH press, show the need
for more urgent decision in formulating these questions as open-ended’
(International Monitoring Operation 2012b: 17). After the ﬁnal, revised
questionnaire had been published, the third IMO report stated that ‘the latest
formulation of the questions as semi opened is acceptable compromise for the
NGOs’ (International Monitoring Operation 2012d: 13).
Leading up to enumeration, members of the civic campaign engaged in a
range of activities to emphasise that citizens should not feel pressured when an-
swering the three sensitive questions and to highlight the politicisation of the
census. In the words of one activist, ‘what we tried to explain, is that actually
the question is how you identify politically, not how you identify in terms of
your collective identity’.30 Some activists made clear how they would person-
ally opt out of ethnic identiﬁcation and instead identify as Bosnian and/or
Herzegovinian in response to the ethnic/national afﬁliation question, but the
civic campaign in general avoided recommending speciﬁc responses in the
way that the ethnic campaigns did.31 Here again, campaigners appealed to
the international norm of the right to self-identiﬁcation (see Koalicija
Jednakost 2013). Members of the campaign created animations featuring char-
acters called the ‘Freedom Defenders’32 and took part in television debates
with members of the Bosniak ethnic campaign.33
Civic campaigners also made use of the census as an opportunity to protest
against discrimination in BiH, and in particular, discrimination against
citizens who do not consider themselves as belonging to one of the three
constituent peoples. Koalicija Jednakost [Coalition Equality], which brings to-
gether organisations based in cities including Sarajevo, Banja Luka and
Mostar, for example, organised a campaign called Budi građanin/građanka –
Za BiH bez diskriminacije! [Be a citizen – For a BiH without discrimination!],
which involved public ﬁgures such as Dervo Sejdić (a member of BiH’s Roma
community who in 2009 successfully challenged the country’s constitution at
the European Court of Human Rights) being photographed holding signs with
slogans such as ‘Ja sam čovjek’ [‘I am human’] and ‘Ja sam za BiH bez
diskriminacije’ [‘I am for a BiH without discrimination’] (Klix.ba 2013b).
Relatedly, some saw identiﬁcation as ‘Bosnian’ as a reaction against what they
saw as the SDA’s nationalist, homogenising agenda and attempts to emphasise
Bosniak indigeneity since the adoption of that label in 1993, which they argued
was unnecessarily antagonistic towards Serbs and Croats.34
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For many involved in the civic campaign, identifying as Bosnian had not
just a symbolic rationale, but also instrumental purposes linked to constitu-
tional reform. As one activist put it, identifying as Bosnian in the census had
a certain ‘subversive power’.35 The leaked ﬁgures from the test census ap-
peared to give hope to those dissatisﬁed with Dayton’s institutionalisation of
ethno-politics. Professor Besim Spahić, for example, speaking at an event in
Oslo in January 2013, pointed to the high number of respondents purportedly
identifying as Bosnian in this exercise ‘in both entities’ as evidence that those
people were ‘fed up with the current situation’ (Klix.ba 2013a). For some,
identifying as other than a member of one of the constituent peoples was part
of a broader strategy aimed at promoting constitutional reform:
I was also thinking if there is a large group of people or large percentage of people who
are not belonging – who are not considering themselves as Serbs, Bosniaks or Croats –
then there is a chance that you have a legitimacy to advocate for constitutional changes,
of course, to provide equality for everyone.36
Some campaigners hoped that this legitimacy might have ﬂowed from census
results showing that the number of ‘Bosnians’ or ‘Others’ exceeded the number
of Croats (as the smallest of the three constituent peoples). Other ﬁgures, how-
ever, were more cautious regarding constitutional reform, perhaps reﬂecting
broader scepticism amongst civic voices about the value of engagement with
formal politics that was also a feature of the widespread protests against cor-
ruption and poor social conditions that took place in 2014 (see Murtagh
2016).37 One interviewee, for example, argued that ‘I think that people are
aware it is a trap’ to aspire to constitutional reform through the census, since
reform talks would likely end in political deadlock. Nonetheless, the inter-
viewee noted:
[A] hope that if you could have really a citizen option, then you can play in the medium
term a different kind of game, because then you can see yourself entering inside the in-
stitutions and maybe from inside, doing things.38
A persistent dilemma for civic voices in BiH is that their desire for reform
abandoning some of the more corporate, ascriptive elements of the consocia-
tional institutions established by Dayton – such as the rotating presidency with
its guaranteed representation of the three constituent peoples but not those
who do not identify as Bosniak, Serb or Croat – broadly coincides with the in-
terests of many Bosniak politicians, and is therefore often written off as being
driven by a Bosniak agenda. As McCulloch explains, ‘the SDA presents a plu-
ralist platform but does so knowing that, as the representatives of the largest
community in Bosnia, it would beneﬁt from the introduction of majoritarian
democracy’. Similarly, the more moderate Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(SBiH) argues for the prioritisation of individual over group rights but remains
essentially a Bosniak party (McCulloch 2014: 37). Bosnian Serb parties, mean-
while, oppose any move towards a unitary state, which would involve the
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abolition of the RS, and Croat political parties have at times pushed for the es-
tablishment of a third, Croat entity. The result is, as Touquet (2011: 459)
notes, that the ‘civil option is not an entirely politically neutral term’, due to
what Bieber (2010) terms ‘the co-optation of moderation’, whereby
Bosniak politicians use civic discourse to mask more familiar ethno-national
interests.
Members of the civic campaign saw in the census, however, an opportu-
nity to make an argument for the recognition of a ‘fourth constituency’ in
BiH, existing alongside the three constituent peoples, untainted by the usual
association with Bosniak elites. As a representative of the citizens’ association
Zašto ne? [Why Not?], a member of Koalicija Jednakost, explained:
We were not afraid of the political consequences of the census. We just used the census
as a perfect spot to make the debate, where we wouldn’t be clouded by the Bosniak
mainstream politics at the same time – which in most cases resembles the messages of
the civic constituency, because that’s their way of inﬂuencing their power through being
the majority. So they would adhere to most of the civic messages because it would just
suit their own interests.39
For this interviewee, then, the difﬁculty of assembling a parliamentary major-
ity in favour of constitutional reform only added to this sense that the census
was an ideal forum to highlight the potential of a fourth constituency, be-
cause SDA politicians had thrown their weight behind the Bosniak campaign
instead.
The results
If the 2013 Bosnian census resembled an election campaign, then who won? As
noted earlier, there was a signiﬁcant delay before the ﬁnal results, including
those for the three sensitive questions, were published in June 2016. Some in
the civic campaign recalled that as this delay dragged on, they started to think
that it might have been a sign that many people had rejected identiﬁcation with
the constituent peoples. Speculation arose that, faced with a shock result re-
vealing that a signiﬁcant number of people had identiﬁed as Bosnian rather
than as Bosniak, Serb or Croat, the authorities were deliberately delaying re-
lease. As one activist explained, ‘when the results didn’t come out, people were
hoping, there was a lot of gossip about the fact that probably they didn’t want
to release the results, because it was this fourth force there’.40 Another inter-
viewee recalled that the length of the processing time made people suspicious
that the results were being manipulated.41
When the results were ﬁnally released, however, it was clear that the
Bosniak and other ethnic campaigns had ‘won’. The ﬁnal results showed that
50.1 per cent of the population had declared as Bosniak, 30.8 per cent as Serb
and 15.4 per cent as Croat in response to the ethnic/national afﬁliation ques-
tion (Recknagel 2016) – a total of 96.3 identifying with the constituent peoples.
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The results for religion and language followed a similar pattern. For civic cam-
paigners, these results were clearly a disappointment, although they responded
to them in diverse ways. One campaigner described the results as a wake-up
call, making her realise just how deeply divided BiH was.42 Another reasoned
that ‘people were thinking practically’ when they completed the census,
recalling several anecdotes about friends who worked in the public sector
and had identiﬁed as Bosniak for fear of facing discrimination or losing their
jobs if they did otherwise.43 Others, including those who were involved in mon-
itoring the census, noted reports of irregularities with the enumeration process
and suggested that the results could not be regarded as reliable.44 They also
pointed to the fact that the ethnic campaigns had the backing of BiH’s main
political parties and therefore had much greater resources.
Convenient myths appeared to assist each of the campaigns at different
stages of the census. The rumour that members of the diaspora would stand
to lose property rights no doubt ampliﬁed the calls made by the Bosniak cam-
paign for emigrants to return to the country to be enumerated. Interviewees
also pointed to anecdotal evidence of the impact of the idea that by identifying
other than as a member of the three constituent peoples, citizens might open
themselves up to discrimination. While reassurances of the conﬁdentiality of
census data might have assuaged these concerns, the rumours need to be un-
derstood in the context of BiH’s low levels of social and institutional trust
(see Dyrstad and Listhaug 2017; Håkansson and Sjöholm 2007). By contrast,
the leaked results from the test census might have been expected to provide a
boost for the civic campaign, demonstrating the potential size of the ‘constitu-
ency’ of people prepared to reject ethno-national identiﬁcation and signalling
to those considering identifying as Bosnian that they would not be alone.
Reﬂecting on the leaked ﬁgures, interviewees acknowledged that they were
most likely fabricated by a journalist, with one describing them as ‘fake news’
and explaining that even if the proportion of people in the test exercise describ-
ing themselves as Bosnian had been correct, the sample was not a representa-
tive one in any case.45 The news about the test census appeared to suit the civic
campaign, and so its members did not do much to counter theDnevni list story.
However, as things turned out, this news might have had the opposite effect,
spurring the ethnic campaigns into action.
Members of the Bosniak campaign expressed their satisfaction at the census
results, by contrast. A representative of Fondacija Popis 2013 stressed that the
precise proportion of people identifying as Bosniak did not matter, so much as
what the proportions implied about the future of the state. He argued that the
results avoided a ‘confusing situation’ (presumably where ‘Bosnians’ were sig-
niﬁcant in number) and went on to state:
Who cares whether it is 49 per cent Bosniaks? Whether it’s 48 per cent or 50 per cent, it
doesn’t mean anything. Either you will get – you won’t be able to get anything because
you already have a gridlock in political situations either way, it’s in the sense of time –
it’s clearly a trend whether that is 45, 46, 47 or 48 per cent, 50 per cent, it’s a trendline in
respect of 50 years.46
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The same interviewee did, however, express regret that a compromise could
not be found between the Agency for Statistics and the RS Institute of
Statistics regarding the ﬁnal results. There is a certain irony here, given that
the RS Institute grants a prominent place to the actions of the Bosniak
campaign in its detailed analysis of the census process, in which it explains
its reasons for rejecting the published results (Republika Srpska Institute of
Statistics 2017: 69–72). Indeed, an ofﬁcial at the Institute described the
Bosniak campaign as an ‘anti-campaign’, which ‘was at least ten times
stronger’ than the ofﬁcial public information campaign about the census.47
Conclusion
It is unsurprising that the ﬁrst post-war census in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
with its political system based on the principle of group rights, was accompa-
nied by campaigns led by ethnic entrepreneurs seeking to mobilise people to
maximise their group’s share of the recorded population. What is more notable
is that these campaigns faced competition from a group of organisations that
sought to highlight individuals’ right to self-identiﬁcation, some of which
encouraged people to reject ethnic identiﬁcation and instead adopt a civic
‘Bosnian’ identity for the purposes of enumeration.
Analysing the motives behind the civic campaign run by these organisations
alongside those of the most prominent of the ethnic campaigns run by Bosniak
ethnic entrepreneurs, this article has demonstrated the symbolic and instru-
mental rationales for census mobilisation in BiH. Symbolically, the 2013 cen-
sus was important as it was the ﬁrst to feature a Bosniak tick-box, and ethnic
campaigners portrayed attempts to dissuade Bosniaks from identifying as such
as amounting to discrimination against the group and as furthering the aims of
those who committed genocide during the 1992–1995 war. The civic campaign,
meanwhile, also made appeals based on ideas of ﬁghting discrimination, but
with a focus instead on that inherent in the country’s constitution. This pro-
vides for a complex system of power sharing between representatives of
Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, with the result that ‘Others’ face constitutional
discrimination, which the civic campaign sought to highlight. More instrumen-
tally, the Bosniak ethnic campaign can be understood as a response to the
incentives provided by the constitution, in that campaigners argued that by
stepping outside of the constitutional logic of the three constituent peoples,
their target audience would potentially surrender their group-based political
rights. Members of the civic campaign, by contrast, saw in the census an
opportunity to contest and subvert the logic of the constitution by demonstrat-
ing that a signiﬁcant number of Bosnian citizens did not identify with any of
the three constituent peoples, with some hoping that this would
generate pressure for constitutional reform. While many in the civic campaign
were pessimistic about the chances of forcing reform through census results,
this pessimism meant that they were able to campaign without the risk of their
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agenda being co-opted by Bosniak political parties, who were instead invested
in efforts to maximise the Bosniak share of the population.
The case of the 2013 census demonstrates the signiﬁcant barriers that civic
movements face in post-war BiH. While the civic campaign was able to score
an early victory in its demand that the census questions on ethnicity/nationality,
religion and language should take a more open format than initially planned, this
was only possible thanks to the campaign’s appeals to international actors to in-
tervene. Appeals to citizens to opt out of ethnic identiﬁcation, meanwhile, tended
to be made by individual campaigners rather than being part of an overall cam-
paign strategy and met with little success. The ethnic campaigns, by contrast, in-
cluding the Bosniak one analysed here, had the backing of prominent politicians,
were better funded, organised through religious and cultural institutions, and gave
clearer instructions on how people should identify. The ethnic campaigns also
likely beneﬁtted from the widespread fear amongst citizens that by failing to
identify with one of the country’s three ‘constituent peoples’ on the census form,
they might open themselves up to discrimination – a fear that has to be under-
stood in the context of a lack of trust in assurances of the privacy of census
returns. While some in the civic campaign saw the census as an ideal opportunity
to build pressure for constitutional reform free from association with politicians
narrowly representing the Bosniak majority, their efforts to do so ultimately
served to highlight the challenges of civicmobilisation in a consociational context.
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Notes
1 I do not cite all of these interviews individually, because some informed more general rather
than speciﬁc aspects of the analysis.
2 A ‘Federation-wide social mapping exercise’ did take place in the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (FBiH) in 2002 (Markowitz 2007).
3 Until the 2004 Law on Statistics, Brčko District, which is not a part of either of the entities, had
its own statistics bureau, but the law made this a branch of the Agency for Statistics.
4 As a member of the organisation Zašto ne? (a citizens’ association aiming to improve govern-
ment accountability through increasing civic participation) pointed out, whether the questions
were closed or semi-open was actually dependent on how the enumerator asked them, and the
script for enumerators was not published alongside the draft questionnaire. Interview with Zašto
ne? member, Sarajevo, 27 October 2017. The ﬁrst report of the International Monitoring
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Operation (2012a: 19) notes that the questions ‘are formulated as semi-open and not as open
questions as suggested in [Conference of European Statisticians] Recommendations’.
5 In former Yugoslavia, as elsewhere in post-socialist Europe, the term ‘nationality’ tends not to
refer to citizenship but is rather viewed as analogous to ethnicity. See Bringa (1995: 23–29) for a de-
tailed discussion.
6 According to one Bitno je biti Bošnjak interviewee, the coalition eventually had more than 100
NGOs as members. Interview with Bitno je biti Bošnjak member, Sarajevo, 2 November 2017.
7 See https://youtu.be/cmd-WXoY6v8.
8 See, for example, https://youtu.be/wDJ06knmBHM.
9 Interview with Bitno je biti Bošnjak member, Sarajevo, 2 November 2017.
10 Interview with Fondacija Popis 2013 member, Sarajevo, 17 October 2017.
11 See http://www.popis2013.net/index.php.
12 See http://popis2013.net/download/aﬁsa-popis-2013.pdf.
13 Interview with Bitno je biti Bošnjak member, Sarajevo, 2 November 2017.
14 Interview with Bitno je biti Bošnjak member, Sarajevo, 2 November 2017.
15 Interview with Fondacija Popis 2013 member, Sarajevo, 17 October 2017.
16 Interview with Bitno je biti Bošnjak member, Sarajevo, 2 November 2017.
17 A similar argument is made by the Congress of North American Bosniaks in its press release:
‘All those who primary identify themselves as Bosnians and Herzegovinians must also declare their
identity as Bosniaks because it is one of only three constituent ethnic groups ofﬁcially recognised
by the Dayton Constitution’ (Congress of North American Bosniaks 2012).
18 Interview with Bitno je biti Bošnjak member, Sarajevo, 2 November 2017. While it is true that
Bosniaks from the RS cannot run for the seat on the rotating presidency reserved for a Serb from
the RS, the idea that census forms could be used as evidence of self-declared ethnicity for electoral
purposes seems to go against the principle of conﬁdentiality of census data.
19 Interview with Bitno je biti Bošnjak member, Sarajevo, 2 November 2017.
20 Interview with Fondacija Popis 2013 member, Sarajevo, 17 October 2017.
21 Interview with Bitno je biti Bošnjak member, Sarajevo, 2 November 2017.
22 Interview with Fondacija Popis 2013 member, Sarajevo, 17 October 2017.
23 See http://popis2013.net/index.php?docid=975.
24 For example, a member of the civic campaign noted that while these rumours were quite prom-
inent, ‘I never heard someone telling them “okay, you are going to lose your property” – these are
just rumours’. Interview with civil society activist, Tuzla, 1 November 2017.
25 Interview with Fondacija Popis 2013 member, Sarajevo, 17 October 2017.
26 Interview with Inicijativa za slobodu izjašnjavanja member, Sarajevo, 2 November 2017.
27 Interview with Inicijativa za slobodu izjašnjavanja member, Sarajevo, 2 November 2017.
28 Interview with civil society activist, Tuzla, 1 November 2017.
29 See https://www.facebook.com/pg/inicijativaza.sloboduizjasnjavanja/photos/?tab=album&
album_id=1624293624508951.
30 Interview with Zašto ne? member, Sarajevo, 27 October 2017.
31 Interview with Zašto ne? member, Sarajevo, 27 October 2017. See also Malagić (2013).
32 See http://zastone.ba/en/watch-the-second-video-from-the-equality-coalition-the-party/.
33 See, for example, https://youtu.be/bBNsQICEXtw.
34 Interview with Koalicija Jednakost member, Sarajevo, 20 October 2017.
35 Interview with Koalicija Jednakost member, Sarajevo, 20 October 2017.
36 Interview with civil society activist, Tuzla, 1 November 2017.
37 Indeed, many of the individuals involved in the census campaigns were also involved in the
2014 protests and the subsequent plenum movement and in the earlier protests about the failure
of parliament to adopt legislation on the issuance of identiﬁcation numbers to new-born babies,
which took place in 2013.
38 Interview with civil society activist, Sarajevo, 30 October 2017.
39 Interview with Zašto ne? member, Sarajevo, 27 October 2017.
40 Interview with civil society activist, Sarajevo, 30 October 2017.
41 Interview with Koalicija Jednakost member, Sarajevo, 20 October 2017.
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42 Interview with civil society activist, Sarajevo, 30 October 2017.
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